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Abstract  
Past studies that examine the impact of ethanol mandates on fuel prices make the assumption that 
ethanol and gasoline are perfect substitutes because they are both sources of energy in 
transportation fuels. These studies, however, have been of limited use in informing current policy 
debates because the short- to medium-run reality is one of strong regulatory and infrastructure 
rigidities that restrict how ethanol can be consumed in the United States. Our objective here is to 
improve understanding of how these rigidities change the findings of existing studies. We 
accomplish this by estimating the impacts of higher ethanol mandates using a new open-economy, 
partial equilibrium model of gasoline, ethanol, and blending whereby motorists buy one of two 
fuels: E10, which is a blend of 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent gasoline, or E85 which is a high 
ethanol blend. The model is calibrated to recent data to provide current estimates. We find that the 
effects of increasing ethanol mandates that are physically feasible to meet on the price of E10 are 
close to zero. This result is robust to different gasoline supply elasticities and gasoline export 
demand elasticities. The impact of the size of the corn harvest on E10 prices is much larger than 
the effects of mandates. Increased mandates can have a large effect on the price of E85 if the 
mandates are increased to levels that approach consumption capacity. These findings show that 
concern about the consumer price of fuel do not justify a reduction in feasible ethanol mandates.  
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Impact of Ethanol Mandates on Fuel Prices when Ethanol and Gasoline are Imperfect 
Substitutes 
 
Economists seem to have a good understanding of the effects of biofuel mandates on blended 
fuel prices. Lapan and Moschini (2012) and de Gorter and Just (2009) show that higher ethanol 
mandates will lead to higher fuel prices under perfect competition when ethanol and gasoline are 
perfect substitutes and if gasoline supply is perfectly elastic. These assumptions characterize a 
market in long-run equilibrium in a small country that imports gasoline. This is a straightforward 
result under these assumptions because the cost of complying with increased mandates must be 
borne by consumers. Rajagopal and Plevin (2013) and Bento, Klotz, and Landry (2104) also 
study the impact of biofuel mandates on fuel prices, making similar assumptions that best hold in 
long-run equilibrium. They find that mandates can either increase or decrease blended fuel prices 
depending on what supply and demand elasticities are assumed, findings that are consistent with 
the Lapan and Moschini (2012) and de Gorter and Just (2009) results. 
 Despite these findings the debate about the impact of the Renewable Fuels Standard 
(RFS) on fuel prices continues. Throughout 2013, the oil industry cited NERA (2012), which 
predicted sharp increases in blended fuel prices if oil companies were forced to comply with 
biofuel mandates contained in the RFS. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2014) was 
tasked in part with determining the impact of the RFS on fuel prices. CBO analysts did not rely 
on the existing economic literature because the underlying assumptions abstract too much from 
current market drivers and compliance issues that CBO wanted to account for. What is common 
to both the CBO study and the NERA study is a focus on short- and medium-run rigidities in the 
market for blended fuels and the impact of mandates on the price of Renewable Identification 
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Numbers (RINs). The important rigidities in fuel markets include an inability to blend more than 
10 percent ethanol with gasoline (the so-called E10 blend wall), the lack of fueling stations that 
sell E85 (a gasoline-ethanol blend containing up to 83 percent ethanol), and a lack of flex 
vehicles that can use E85. Both Lapan and Moschini (2012) and de Gorter and Just (2009b) do 
not need to address any impact of these market rigidities because they assume that ethanol and 
gasoline are perfect substitutes. Under this assumption it makes no difference whether RIN 
prices are included in the price of ethanol or whether they are modeled as a tax on gasoline 
production because consumers ultimately pay the tax so there was no need to model RIN prices 
explicitly. 
The issue of biofuel mandates effects on fuel prices has taken on heightened importance 
because of heated debates about whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should 
allow ethanol mandates to continue to grow. Many in the oil industry have used the specter of 
higher pump prices to argue against increased mandates. For example, Tom O’Malley, chairman 
of PBF Energy, is quoted in a Reuters article as saying that the price of RINs is a hidden tax on 
consumers because his company will have to pass the rising costs of RINs on to consumers.1 Mr. 
O’Malley is also quoted in a Platts article: “This price increase will be passed along to 
consumers, raising the pump price […].”2 According to other press reports, the concern about 
high RIN prices was also expressed by White House officials who weighed in on the review of 
EPA’s proposed reductions in mandate levels for 2014. Amanda Peterka reported on January 6, 
2014 that Office of Management and Budget reviewers wrote, “If volumes are too low, no harm 
no foul. If volumes are too high, then the prices of RINs will be high and we will face a real 
1Article available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/pbf-earnings-rins-idUSL2N0DJ23820130502.  
2 Platts. April 20, 2013. “RINs are a disaster for US consumers: PBF Energy chairman.” Article available at 
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/newyork/rins-are-a-disaster-for-us-consumers-pbf-energy-21944290.  
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problem.”3 Peterka’s article did not detail exactly what problems high RIN prices were supposed 
to lead to, but lower profits for oil companies or higher pump prices for consumers seem likely. 
Our objective here is to reduce the level of abstraction in existing models of blended fuel 
markets to enhance understanding of how short- and medium-term market realities impact how 
biofuel mandates will affect blended fuel prices. Anderson (2009) finds consumer attitudes 
towards E85 in Minnesota that are inconsistent with the assumption of ethanol and gasoline 
being perfect substitutes. Salvo and Huse (2013) demonstrate that, even in Brazil, ethanol and 
gasoline are not perfect substitutes because of heterogeneity of consumer attitudes towards 
ethanol. Pouliot and Babcock (2014) demonstrate how a lack of fueling stations in the United 
States limits the degree of substitution even further. In addition, important restrictions exist on 
the ability to blend ethanol and gasoline. Almost all gasoline in the United States is E10. The 
gasoline that is used as a blendstock in E10 has been formulated to take advantage of ethanol’s 
high octane content. Thus, ethanol is primarily used in fixed proportions with gasoline. Most 
consumers would continue to consume E10 even if ethanol mandates were set at levels that could 
not be achieved through E10 consumption alone. At least initially, fuel would not be sold as E11 
or E12 to meet higher mandate levels because most automotive emission systems were designed 
to run on E10 and there are few fuel retailers who sell blends with more than 10 percent ethanol. 
It was not until 2012 and 2013 model years that some automobile manufacturers released cars 
that are warrantied to run on blends that contain up to 15 percent ethanol. Thus, at least in the 
medium-term, it is likely that if ethanol mandates exceed the level that can be met through E10 
3 Peterka, A. Jan. 6, 2014. “White House urged EPA restraint on 2014 RFS targets.”  Available at 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059992426. 
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consumption then compliance would be achieved through increased consumption of E85 in flex 
fuel vehicles (CBO 2014).4  
The model we employ to better understand the impact of ethanol mandates is an open-
economy, partial equilibrium model of the markets for ethanol, gasoline, and blending. Trade in 
gasoline is included to enable evaluation of the prediction by NERA (2012) that higher ethanol 
mandates will cause US gasoline producers to increase exports as a compliance strategy rather 
than supply the domestic market with gasoline. The model contains three features that enable it 
to be used for medium-run policy analysis. First, it includes separate fuel demand functions for a 
low-ethanol blended fuel (E10) and a high-ethanol blended fuel (E85). The two fuels are 
imperfect substitutes because of a lack of fueling infrastructure for E85 and consumer 
heterogeneity. The equilibrium effects of increased mandates that can only be met with increased 
consumption of E85 are estimated, as in CBO (2014). Second, ethanol and gasoline are 
demanded in fixed proportions in E10 because of medium-run costs of obtaining gasoline that 
does not require ethanol to raise its octane value. Third, the incidence of high RIN prices is 
modeled explicitly by modeling zero-profit blenders who buy gasoline from oil refineries and 
ethanol and RINs from biofuel plants. Blenders sell their RINs to domestic refineries who have 
endogenous RIN obligations that depend on the quantity of gasoline consumed domestically. 
Thus, our model is able to analyze the claims of some in the oil industry that compliance with 
ethanol mandates that cannot be met through E10 consumption will lead to sharply higher 
gasoline exports and higher domestic fuel prices. 
We find that compliance with ethanol mandates that are feasible to meet with current 
infrastructure would have small, if any, effects on the retail price of E10. Because increased E85 
4 See Qiu, Colson, and Wetzstein (2014) for an analysis of the effects of widespread adoption of E15 on the demand 
for E85 and gasoline. 
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consumption would be the primary compliance mechanism, the retail price of E85 would depend 
on the level of mandate, sharply declining as mandate levels approach their maximum feasible 
limits.  
 
The Model 
The overall purpose of our model is to estimate the price impacts of compliance with increased 
ethanol mandates implemented under the RFS. Details about the RFS can be found in Schnepf 
and Yacobucci (2013). Because compliance involves three parts of the fuel supply chain, our 
model includes producers of gasoline and ethanol, fuel blenders who buy wholesale gasoline and 
ethanol to produce fuels to be sold at retail outlets, and final fuel consumers. Figure 1 illustrates 
the structure of the model. Upstream firms are refineries producing gasoline and ethanol plants 
producing ethanol from corn. Blenders are middlemen that purchase gasoline and ethanol to 
produce two gasoline blends, E10 and E85. Motorists buy E10 and E85, and owners of flex 
vehicles can choose either fuel so they are substitutes in demand. The market for RINs runs 
parallel to the markets for fuel. RINs are attached to each gallon of ethanol produced. When 
ethanol is blended with gasoline, RINs are detached from ethanol by blenders and can then be 
sold in the RIN market. Refineries create a Renewable Volume Obligation (RVO) when they 
produce gasoline that is consumed domestically. Each refinery’s RVO is proportionate to the 
amount of gasoline they produce. Compliance with an RVO is demonstrated by submitting RINs 
to EPA. 
It is possible to derive analytical results if simple-enough functional forms are adopted. 
However, the solutions are cumbersome and are difficult to interpret, so they give limited insight 
into the problem. Instead, we specify functional forms, calibrate the model to recent data, and 
5 
 
solve the model numerically to show the impacts of RFS compliance on fuel prices under 
alternative values of key parameters. 
 
Refineries 
Refineries process crude oil into gasoline. As obligated parties, refineries show compliance by 
submitting to EPA RINs equal to their RVO. The RVO equals the product of the percentage 
standard κ  and the quantity of gasoline that each refinery produces that is sold domestically: 
0dgx ≥ . Given a RIN price ρ , the compliance cost of a refinery is 
d
gxρκ  and marginal 
compliance cost is ρκ  assuming that a refinery’s sales are too small to affect the price of RINs. 
Because the United States has become a net exporter of gasoline we denote a refinery’s export 
quantity as 0wgx ≥ . Exports do not affect a refinery’s RVO so the profit of a competitive refinery 
is 
 d d w w d d wr g g g g g r g gw x w x x c x xπ ρκ  = + − − +   , 
where dgw  is the domestic price of gasoline at wholesale, 
w
gw  is the world price of gasoline and 
d w
r g gc x x +   is the cost of producing a quantity 
d w
g gx x+  of gasoline. 
 The first order conditions for profit maximization are 
 0dr g rd
g
w c
x
π
ρκ
∂ ′= − − =
∂
; 
 0wr g rw
g
w c
x
π∂ ′= − =
∂
.  
When these conditions hold with equality, the domestic wholesale gasoline price commands a 
premium over the world price to cover the cost of RINs to refineries such that  
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(1) d wg gw w ρκ= + . 
That is, because refineries are free to export gasoline, the marginal return on domestic gasoline 
must at least equal the marginal return on gasoline exported. The size of the price difference 
equals marginal compliance cost. Inverting the marginal cost function, the supply curve of 
refineries is a function of the world gasoline price: 1d w wg g r gx x c w
−′  + =   . For model calibration 
purposes we assume US gasoline supply has constant elasticity: 
(2) ( )d w wg g gx x w
ε
α+ = , 
where 0ε ≥  is the supply elasticity and α  is a calibrating parameter. 
 The United States has been a net exporter of gasoline since 2009. Trade volumes are 
small compared to the size of the US domestic market, with net exports representing about three 
percent of US gasoline consumption in 2013. Trade occurs throughout the year and import and 
export prices for gasoline are nearly identical. We write the export demand for US gasoline as 
(3) ( )w wg gx w
η
β= . 
where 0η ≤  is the elasticity of export demand for US gasoline and β  is a calibrating parameter. 
We perform sensitivity analysis on the value of η , allowing the export demand to vary from 
perfectly elastic, in which the United States is a small exporting country, to scenarios where the 
United States is a large exporting country facing a downward-sloping export demand curve. 
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Ethanol Plants 
Almost all ethanol in the United States is produced from corn. As ethanol production relies on 
fermentation of sugar in corn, the technology allows for little input substitution. Other than corn, 
inputs in the production of ethanol include natural gas, labor, enzymes and denaturant. Corn is by 
far the largest cost of ethanol plants and thus production decisions largely depend on the price of 
corn. One bushel of corn yields about 2.8 gallons of ethanol. 
 Ethanol plants produce a quantity of ethanol ex  that they sell wholesale to blenders at 
price pew . This price is the sum of the two components: the value that blenders place on ethanol 
in the fuel market, bew  , and the price of the RIN that is attached to the ethanol 
(4) p be ew w ρ= + .  
We describe later what determines the fuel value of ethanol to blenders. Profit to an ethanol plant 
is  
 [ ]pe e e e ew x c xπ = −  , 
where [ ]e ec x  is the cost of producing a quantity ex  of ethanol. For simplicity, we assume that 
this cost function is net of revenues generated through byproduct sales. The cost of producing 
ethanol increases with respect to quantity because increased ethanol production increases the 
price of corn and because of cost heterogeneity between ethanol plants.  
The first order condition for profit maximization is 
(5) 0pe e e
e
w c
x
π∂ ′= − =
∂
. 
That is, in equilibrium, the sum of the value of ethanol as a fuel and the price of RINs equals the 
marginal cost of producing ethanol.  
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Equation (5) shows that at equilibrium, the price of ethanol equals the marginal cost of 
ethanol, thus defining the inverse supply curve. Taking the horizontal sum of ethanol plants’ 
marginal cost curve yields the aggregate inverse supply curve of ethanol. We derive a quadratic 
supply curve of ethanol following the methodology described in Babcock (2013). We calibrate 
the supply of ethanol to the May 2014 USDA World Agriculture Supply and Demand Estimates 
report (USDA Office of the Chief Economist 2014). In the base case, the US average corn yield 
is set at 161 bushels per acre. The inverse supply curve of ethanol is 
(6) 21.2064 0.0475 0.0019pe e ew x x= + + . 
We investigate the impact of lower and higher corn yields on this supply curve. If corn yield falls 
to 130 bushels per acre, the inverse supply curve of corn becomes
21.6271 0.0534 0.0040pe e ew x x= + + . If corn yield increases to 170 bushels per acre because of 
favorable growing conditions then the inverse supply curve of ethanol becomes
21.0881 0.0340 0.0018pe e ew x x= + + . 
 
Blenders 
Almost all gasoline sold in the United States is E10, a blend that contains no more than 10 
percent ethanol. Other gasoline blends containing a larger share of ethanol are also distributed in 
a relatively small number of fuel stations. Among alternative gasoline blends, E85 which 
contains between 51 and 83 percent ethanol, offers the greatest potential to move the most 
ethanol per volume of motor fuel sold at retail. The share of ethanol in E85 varies across regions 
and throughout the calendar year, with E85 containing less ethanol to facilitate cold start when 
temperatures are low. E85 contains on average about 75 percent ethanol. 
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Our model assumes that E10 and E85 are available at retail. Competitive blenders 
purchase wholesale gasoline and ethanol to produce retail gasoline blends. The production of 
E10 and E85 use fixed proportion technologies. Ethanol has an octane level of 113. Thus, an 87 
octane E10 blend is created when it is blended with 84 octane refinery gasoline. It is technically 
possible for refineries to produce gasoline with higher octane without ethanol but ethanol 
appears to be the low cost way of formulating an 87 octane final fuel as long as ethanol is priced 
not more than 10 percent greater than gasoline (United States Department of Energy 2012). Our 
model assumes that E10 contains exactly 10 percent ethanol.  
Octane level is not an issue for E85 because of the large share of ethanol. The model 
assumes that E85 contains 75 percent ethanol because with a binding mandate, E85 would be 
used to move as much ethanol as possible. As such it is reasonable to assume that E85 contains 
75 percent ethanol, the apparent feasible maximum. 
We assume a competitive blending industry earning zero profit. In addition, we assume 
no cross-subsidization between E10 and E85 such that zero profit conditions hold for both fuels. 
The formulations of the fuel blends and the zero profit conditions imply 
(7) 10 0.9 0.1 ,d bg ep w w= +  
(8) 85 0.25 0.75d bg ep w w= + , 
where 10p  is the wholesale price of E10 and 85p  is the wholesale price of E85. The quantity of 
each blend equals the quantity of ethanol and gasoline contained in the blends: 
(9) 10 10 10g eq q q= + ,  
(10) 85 85 85g eq q q= + . 
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The formulations of the fuel blends imply that 10 109g eq q=  and 
85 853 g eq q= . At equilibrium, the 
quantity of gasoline purchased by blenders, 10 85g gq q+ , equals the quantity of gasoline sold 
domestically by refineries, dgx , and the quantity of ethanol purchased by blenders 
10 85
e eq q+  
equals the quantity of ethanol produced ex . We assume no trade in ethanol. 
 As Figure 1 shows, one role of blenders is to detach RINs from ethanol and transfer them 
to refineries that use them to show compliance with their RVOs. In keeping with our assumption 
of competitive markets we assume that blenders detach RINs from ethanol and sell them to 
refineries at zero cost earning zero profit. The RIN market clears from the difference in the value 
of ethanol in blended fuels (7) and (8) and the cost of producing ethanol in (4) and (5). The 
mandate specifies that 
(11) ( )10 85 10 85e e g gq q q qκ+ ≥ + . 
If equation (11) holds with equality, then the mandate is binding and the price of RINs is greater 
than zero. Otherwise, the mandate does not bind and the price of RINs is zero.  
 
Consumer Demand for Fuel  
Most light vehicles in the United States are certified to run on gasoline blends that contain no 
more than 10 percent ethanol. However, a growing number of vehicles are flex fuel vehicles 
(FFV) that can run on gasoline blends that contain more than 10 percent ethanol. According to 
EIA (2014), there were approximately 218 million light-duty vehicles running on gasoline in the 
United States. Pouliot and Babcock’s (2014) data show that there were about 14.6 million FFVs 
in the United States in early 2013. Our model takes into account the degree of substitution that 
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can occur between E10 and E85 given this number of FFVs. In addition, our model accounts for 
the limited number of stations that actually sell E85. 
 Motorists driving conventional vehicles can only consume E10, which is widely 
distributed and can be found at a virtually zero search cost. The demand for E10 by conventional 
motorists is a decreasing function of the retail price of E10: 
(12) ( )10 10c c cq N p φβ=   , 
where 10 10p p m= +  is the price of E10 at the pump accounting for a constant wholesale to retail 
price markup m . The parameter 0φ ≤  is the elasticity of demand, cβ  is a demand parameter that 
we calibrate based on observed values of 10cq  and 10p  for an individual motorist, and cN  is the 
number of conventional vehicles.  
The demand for fuel by owners of FFVs is not as straightforward. FFV owners can fuel 
with either E10 or E85. When modeling the demand for E10 and E85 by FFV motorists, it is 
paramount to correct prices and volumes for the relative energy contents of these fuels. Ethanol 
contains about two-thirds the energy per volume of gasoline. As such, gasoline blends with a 
larger share of ethanol yield lower fuel economy. For example, for E85 that contains 75 percent 
ethanol and 25 percent gasoline and for E10 that contains 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent 
gasoline, E85 contains 77.6 percent of the energy of E10 (i.e. 0.776=(0.75*2/3 + 
0.25*1)/(0.1*2/3 + 0.9*1)).  
 We do not derive the demand for E10 and E85 by flex motorists here. Instead, we borrow 
the demand estimates from Pouliot and Babcock (2014). Their estimates build from the choice 
model in Anderson (2012) and from similar models used to explain Brazil’s motor fuel demand 
in Salvo and Huse (2013), Du and Carriquiry (2013), and Pouliot (2013). We describe briefly 
below how Pouliot and Babcock (2014) derive the demand for E85. 
12 
 
Pouliot and Babcock (2014) consider that motorists internalize the cost of driving extra 
distance to find an E85 pump. We write that the total costs of fueling with fuel { }10,85j =  is ˆ jp
. That cost accounts for difference in fuel efficiency relative to E10 and for the convenience cost 
of selecting a specific fuel. The convenience cost of E10 is zero because it is widely distributed 
and available wherever E85 is available such that 10 10pˆ p=  . E85 is sparsely distributed such that 
many motorists who want to buy E85 must drive out of their way to find an E85 pump. The total 
cost of E85 is ( )85 85pˆ p c dα= +  where 1/ 0.776α =  transforms E85 into an energy equivalent 
price of E10 and ( )c d  is the convenience cost of driving a distance d  to find an E85 pump. 
Pouliot and Babcock (2014) calculate the distance d  from the zip code location of all US FFVs 
to the nearest location of the nearly 2,500 fuel stations that offer E85 in the United States.  
 Using a choice model similar to Anderson (2012), Pouliot and Babcock (2014) estimate 
the demand by owners of FFVs in all continental US zip codes based on the price of E85 and the 
difference between the price of E85 and the price of E10. The expression for the aggregated US 
demand for E85 by FFVs from Pouliot and Babcock (2014) is 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
max
85 1085 85 85
0
ˆˆ 1 ˆ
d
f f fq N p H g x dp p x
φ
β= − −∫  , 
where fN  is the number of FFVs, ( )85 10ˆ ˆpH p−  is the share of FFV motorists who fuel with 
E10 such that ( )85 101 ˆ ˆpH p− −  is the share of FFV motorists that fuel with E85, ( )85 85ˆf p φβ  is 
the demand for motor fuel by individual FFV motorists, ( )g x  is the marginal distribution 
function of the distance between FFVs and E85 fuel stations per zip code, and maxd  is the 
maximum distance observed to an E85 pump. We assume that the elasticity of demand for fuel 
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of individual FFV motorists is the same as motorists driving conventional cars. The demand for 
E10 by FFV motorists is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
max
10 10 10
0
85 10ˆ ˆ ˆ
d
f f f pq N p H g x dxp
φ
β= −∫ . 
We calibrate the value of the parameters 85fβ  and 10fβ  such that an FFV motorist would 
consume a volume of E85 that yields the same distance driven as E10 if the two gasoline blends 
are priced at parity. 
 The expressions above do not fully characterize the reality of the distribution of E85. In 
particular, fuel stations have limited capacity to dispense E85 because they have only one or two 
pumps installed or because of limited capacity to accommodate large traffic. Pouliot and 
Babcock (2014) incorporates capacity limits by retailers by assuming that each fuel station 
cannot dispense more than 45,000 gallons of E85 per month. The demand we use accounts for 
the limited E85 distribution capacities. 
 At equilibrium, the supply of E10 equals the demand for E10 by conventional and FFV 
motorists 
(13) 10 10 10c fq q q= + ,  
and the supply of E85 equals the demand for E85 by FFV motorists 
(14) 85 85fq q= . 
 
Model Calibration 
We calibrate the model based on observed data for the 2013 calendar year and from parameter 
estimates from the literature. Table 1 shows parameter values and sources of data we use to 
calibrate the model. For the world price of gasoline, we use the average transaction price of US 
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imports and exports of gasoline in 2013. From USITC (2014) we obtain a 2013 average gasoline 
price of $2.87/gal and US net exports of gasoline of 4.1 billion gallons. Data on consumption and 
prices of gasoline blends at retail and on the number of vehicles are from EIA (2014). We use the 
number of flex vehicles reported by Pouliot and Babcock (2014) because they have the most 
detailed data on the number and location of flex vehicles.5 Lin and Prince (2013) offer a concise 
review of the literature and report that several meta-analyses find short-run demand elasticity for 
gasoline at around -0.25. Note that given the ethanol supply curve in (6) we do not need values 
for the ethanol and RIN prices to calibrate the model. 
Our base case scenario assumes that the United States is a small country in the world 
gasoline market and that US refining capacity is fixed. These assumptions mean that the demand 
curve for US gasoline exports is perfectly elastic and the US supply curve is perfectly inelastic. 
In alternative scenarios, we explore the implications of these assumptions by letting the export 
demand elasticity equal -10 and -1 and by letting the US supply elasticity increase to 0.1 and 1. 
These wide ranges of elasticities values are meant to capture the extent to which our results are 
sensitive to variations in the values of these parameters. Our ranges of elasticities include values 
for these elasticities used in other calibrated models. For example, de Gorter and Just (2009) 
assume a value of 0.2 for the domestic gasoline supply and a value of 2.63 for the elasticity of 
import supply.6 Similarly, Cui et al. (2011) calibrate their model also using a value of 0.2 for the 
domestic gasoline supply and use a foreign oil elasticity of 3.7  
5 EIA (2014) reports a total of 13.8 million FFV in the United States in 2013, 800,000 less than Pouliot and Babcock 
(2014).  
6 The model in de Gorter and Just (2009) was developed at a time when the United States was an importer of 
gasoline.  
7 Cui et al. (2011) assume a fixed coefficient technology for the production of gasoline from oil such that there is a 
direct correspondence between the elasticity of gasoline supply and the elasticity of oil supply. 
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 Table 2 details intermediate steps and final parameter calculation for our calibrated 
model. For parameters of US gasoline supply and export demand we do not report specific 
values because we will conduct sensitivity analysis for the values of gasoline supply elasticity 
and the export demand elasticity. 
Calibration of the demands for E10 and E85 is based on average consumption per 
vehicle. Conventional vehicles comprise cars and light duty vehicles, commercial light trucks 
and freight trucks while flex vehicles are cars and light duty vehicles. This means that flex 
vehicles are on average smaller than conventional vehicles and as such we expect the average 
consumption by flex vehicles to be less than conventional vehicles. We calculate the average 
consumption by flex vehicles by dividing the total consumption of E10 by light-duty vehicles by 
the number of cars and light trucks. This calculation ignores consumption of E85, but historical 
volumes of E85 are small enough compared to volumes of E10 that they have a negligible impact 
on our calculation. We calculate the average consumption by conventional vehicles by dividing 
the total consumption of E10 of all vehicles net of the consumption by flex vehicles by the 
number of conventional vehicles. These calculations yield an average consumption of E10 of 574 
gallons for flex vehicles and 587 gallons for conventional vehicles for 2013. We use these values 
to calculate the parameters for the demand expressions for each vehicle category.  
Figure 2 shows the wholesale demand curve for E85. The price on the vertical axis is 85p  
and is calculated assuming that the wholesale-to-retail markup m  is $0.75 per gallon. The retail 
price of E10  is either $3.95, $3.65, or $3.25 per gallon (wholesale prices of $3.20, $2.90, or 
$2.50 per gallon). Figure 2 shows that the demand curves for E85 are quite flat for prices of E85 
between $2 and $3 per gallon. Those prices are near parity prices with E10 after accounting for 
relative energy content. Between $2 and $3 per gallon, a large share of FFV motorists respond to 
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fuel prices and thus readily switch from one fuel to the other for a small change in the price of 
E85. Thus, in this range the demand for E85 and ethanol is fairly elastic. Further declines in the 
price of E85 will cause some existing stations to hit their capacity limit making the wholesale 
demand for E85 much more inelastic. With about 2,500 fuel stations in the United States 
dispensing E85, the maximum volume of E85 that can be sold in the United States is about 1.25 
billion gallons.  
 Table 1 reports that EIA estimated 196 million gallons of E85 were consumed in 2013 at 
an average price of $3.22 per gallon. Assuming a $0.75 per gallon wholesale-to-retail markup, 
this implies a wholesale price of E85 of $2.47 per gallon. At that price, the demand curve in 
Figure 2 predicts consumption of E85 that is almost double EIA’s estimate. The demand for E85 
derived by Pouliot and Babcock (2014) assumes that the price of E85 is the same at all stations. 
In reality, there are large differences in the price of E85. The average price and the volumes of 
E85 reported by EIA might reflect heterogeneous conditions across regions and time, which 
explains the difference. The demand estimates by Pouliot and Babcock (2014) is appropriate for 
our study because we are interested in ethanol mandates that are binding so that the price of E85 
is set low enough at enough stations to induce adequate consumption. 
  
Results 
We consider several scenarios regarding ethanol mandates and parameter values to gain insight 
into the effect of mandates on fuel prices. We limit our analysis to considering mandates that are 
physically feasible to meet given the current fueling infrastructure. Thus, this analysis is 
appropriate to use to evaluate EPA’s proposal to reduce ethanol mandates to levels that can 
easily be met using E10. In our base case, we assume that gasoline export demand is perfectly 
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elastic and US gasoline supply is perfectly inelastic. We then consider the impacts of shifts in the 
ethanol supply curve due to the size of the corn crop. The sensitivity of impacts to alternative 
gasoline export demand elasticities and US gasoline supply elasticity is then explored.  
 The model is solved by calculating the RVO using a volume of gasoline equal to 
10 850.9 0.25 119.4q q+ = billion gallons. Hence, if the mandate equals 14 billion gallons, the 
percentage obligation of refineries equals 14/119.4=11.7%. Compliance is met with the 
percentage obligation rather than with the volume mandate. Model solutions may therefore show 
ethanol volumes that do not equal the volume mandate and yet the mandate is binding because of 
the percentage obligation. 
 
Base case results 
The base case scenario of a perfectly elastic export demand curve and perfectly inelastic 
domestic supply curve for gasoline assumes that the volume of US exports is too small to affect 
world gasoline prices and that US refineries are operating at capacity. The implication of these 
assumptions for our result is that gasoline export volumes are given by the difference between 
the refining capacity and US domestic use of gasoline. The results are derived assuming a corn 
yield of 161 bushels per acre, which was the yield implied for the 2014 given USDA predicted 
yield for the 2014–15 crop year.8 
 Table 3 shows the results of the base case scenario for mandates varying between 13 
billion gallons and 14.2 billion gallons. The market-clearing quantity of ethanol is 13.67 billion 
8 Corn yield for the 2013–14 crop year was 158.8 bushels per acre, and as of June 2014 USDA predicted corn yield 
of 165.3 bushels per acre for the 2014–15 crop year. Corn supplies for the first eight months of the 2014 calendar 
year come from the 2013–14 crop, while the last four months will be covered by the 2014–15 crop year. Weighting 
the yields by the number of months for each of the crop years, we find an average yield of 161 bushels per acre for 
the 2014 calendar year. 
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gallons. Thus, a mandate below 13.67 billion gallons is not binding and the price of RIN is zero. 
At a non-binding mandate, the quantity of E10 is 133.13 billion gallons priced at a retail price of 
$3.55/gal. The market-clearing volume of E85 is 480 million gallons at a retail price of 
$3.12/gal. The total E10 equivalent consumption of motor gasoline is 133.5 billion gallons at an 
E10 equivalent price of $3.55/gal.  
 Compliance with a mandate of 13.8 billion gallons is met with the blending of 13.85 
billion gallons of ethanol, and a 14 billion gallon mandate is met with the blending of 14.03 
billion gallons of ethanol. The effect of increasing the ethanol mandate beyond 13.67 billion 
gallons on the price and quantity of E10 is small. Compliance with higher mandates is 
accomplished with sharply higher sales of E85 volumes, which occurs because of a significant 
decrease in the price of E85. The total E10 equivalent consumption of motor gasoline marginally 
declines and the average E10 equivalent price increases by only one cent per gallon with 
mandates of 13.8 or 14 billion gallons. The mandate causes a small increase in gasoline exports 
at the constant world price. The value of ethanol to blenders significantly declines with the 
ethanol mandate. Thus, a binding mandate causes the price of RINs to increase to bridge the gap 
between the value of ethanol to blenders and the cost of producing ethanol. 
 Table 3 shows model outcomes for a mandate of 14.2 billion gallons. These reported 
outcomes are not exact solutions because all equations of the model cannot hold with equality 
with a 14.2 billion gallons mandate. The market does not have the capacity to accommodate 
ethanol volumes to comply with a 14.2 billion gallons mandate given production costs for E10 
and E85 and the physical limit on the distribution of E85. Table 3 shows E10 volumes of about 
132.5 billion gallons when the mandate is binding, which implies that 13.25 billion gallons of 
ethanol are consumed as E10. Figure 2 shows that the physical limit on E85 sales equals 1.25 
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billion gallons. With E85 containing 75 percent ethanol, this implies that a maximum of 940 
million gallons of ethanol can be consumed in E85. In total, this places a physical limit on the 
blending ethanol at about 14.18 billion gallons.  
Even though the model does not yield exact solutions for a 14.2 billion gallons mandate, 
it suggests that pushing the mandate to the limit of capacity to blend ethanol would have a small 
impact on the total motor gasoline volumes and on the average price of motor gasoline. The 
reported results also show that with an ethanol mandate at or above the capacity of the market to 
use ethanol drives the value of ethanol to blenders down to zero, which implies that the price 
received by ethanol plants is constituted solely of the price RIN. 
 
Impact of corn yield 
Weather conditions impact corn yields by setting quantities and prices in a crop year, and thus 
impacting the cost of producing ethanol. We explore the implications of low corn yields that 
provide the equivalent of 130 bushels per acre in a calendar year and the implications of a 
bumper crop that increases corn yields to 170 bushels per acre in a calendar year. 
 Table 4 shows solutions for the two alternative corn yield scenarios. We maintain the 
assumption that the United States is a small country in gasoline trade and that US production of 
gasoline is fixed. With corn yields of 130 bushel per acre, the model finds a no-mandate 
consumption of ethanol of 13.31 billion gallons. The smaller quantity of ethanol compared to the 
base case reflects the higher wholesale price of ethanol caused by higher corn prices. Higher 
wholesale ethanol prices result in higher prices and lower quantities for both E10 and E85. 
As in the base case scenario, increasing the mandate has a small impact on the price and 
quantity of E10 but a significant impact on the price and quantity of E85. Refineries meet their 
20 
 
percentage obligation, however, with the high ethanol price the obligation is met with the 
blending of ethanol quantities smaller than the mandated volume. With lower corn yield, an 
increase in the ethanol mandate causes a sharp increase in the price of RINs. The market limit to 
absorb ethanol is, again, slightly below 14.2 billion gallons, and our model does not solve 
exactly with a 14.2 billion gallons mandate. 
With corn yields of 170 bushels per acre, 13.87 billion gallons of ethanol are blended 
with gasoline with no mandate. The price of wholesale ethanol drops which brings down the 
price of E10 to $3.52/gal and the price of E85 to $2.89/gal. Even without a binding mandate, the 
quantity of E85 is 730 million gallons. As in previous scenarios, a binding mandate causes a 
small increase in the price of E10 but a sharp decline in the price of E85. The model does not 
solve for a 14.2 billion gallon mandate as corn yields do not impact the market’s capacity to 
blend ethanol into gasoline. 
Comparing the results in Tables 3 and 4 shows that a drought, such as the one in 2012–13 
when corn yield fell to about 122 bushels per acre, could increase the weighted average of retail 
E10 and E85 fuel prices expressed in E10-equivalent energy units (henceforth referred to simply 
as the average fuel price) by about 10 cents per gallon compared to the base case. A bumper corn 
crop would lower average fuel price by about three cents per gallon. Variability in corn yields 
thus can have a greater impact on retail fuel prices than changes in the mandate levels of biofuel 
within feasible volumes. 
 
Sensitivity analysis to elasticity choices 
Table 5 shows model outcomes for alternative values for the elasticity of the export demand for 
gasoline and for the gasoline supply elasticity. We present four elasticity scenarios that relax the 
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assumption that the United States is a small-country exporter and that its refineries run at 
capacity. All four scenarios in Table 5 keep corn yields at 161 bushels per acre. The first two 
scenarios in Table 5 consider gasoline export demand elasticities of -10 and -2, respectively, and 
keep the assumption of a perfectly inelastic gasoline supply. The results of these scenarios are 
similar to the base case scenario except that the price of E10 and the average price of fuel 
decrease slightly with increases in the ethanol mandates. In the last two scenarios in Table 5, 
gasoline export elasticity is set at -10 and the gasoline supply elasticity is either 0.1 or 1. In these 
scenarios, results are similar to the base case scenario. Unlike the previous two cases where the 
average fuel price declined with respect to the mandated volumes, making gasoline supply more 
elastic causes the average fuel price to increase a small amount with ethanol mandates. 
 
Change in retail fuel price 
As shown in the results tables, the effect of increased ethanol mandates on the average fuel price 
depends on demand and supply elasticities. Scenarios in Table 5 show that a less elastic export 
demand creates conditions favorable for the fuel price to decline. A less-than-perfectly-elastic 
export demand elasticity yields a smaller increase in the quantity of gasoline that is exported in 
response to an increase in the ethanol mandate. This implies that more gasoline is kept in the 
domestic market, thereby depressing domestic gasoline prices. We can calculate the gasoline 
supply elasticity facing US blenders as 
(15) 
d w w
g g g
g d d
g g
x x x
x x
ε ε η
+
= −  . 
This expression says for a less-than-perfectly-elastic export demand η , the smaller the US 
gasoline supply elasticity ε  the more inelastic the supply of gasoline facing blenders. If the 
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export demand is perfectly elastic, the supply of gasoline facing blenders to the United States is 
perfectly elastic because they can simply bid gasoline away from the export market. The results 
in Tables 3 and 5 and the expression for the gasoline supply elasticity facing US blenders 
together say that if the supply of gasoline to the United States is sufficiently inelastic, then an 
increase in the ethanol mandate will cause a decline in the price of E10 and the average price of 
fuel. 
 This result is similar to de Gorter and Just (2009) and Lapan and Moschini (2012) who 
find for some ethanol and gasoline prices that if ethanol supply is more elastic than the gasoline 
supply then increasing the ethanol mandate lowers the price of retail gasoline. In our model, the 
conditions are different because previous studies assume that the value of ethanol being blended 
equals the value of gasoline. This assumption implies that the elasticity of the wholesale demand 
for ethanol is the same as the wholesale demand for gasoline. In contrast, in our model gasoline 
and ethanol are imperfect substitutes and the marginal value of ethanol may either be lower or 
higher than gasoline depending on the preference of the marginal motorist purchasing E85. In 
particular, if the volume of E85 is near distribution capacity limit, the demand for E85 is inelastic 
and the value of ethanol declines rapidly, making the demand for ethanol more inelastic than the 
demand for gasoline. 
The condition for the retail gasoline price to decline depends on the elasticities of supply 
and demand for both gasoline and ethanol. We derive that condition (see the Appendix) using a 
model that is consistent with the model of de Gorter and Just (2009). We show that the more 
inelastic is the demand for ethanol, the more likely it is for an increase in the mandate to cause 
the retail price of fuel to increase. In parallel, an elastic demand for ethanol facilitates the 
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condition for an increase in mandated ethanol volumes to cause a decline in the price of retail 
gasoline. 
Intuitively, we can break down the impact of mandated ethanol volumes on the price of 
blended fuel into four parts. First, the more elastic the ethanol supply, the smaller the impact of 
an increase in the ethanol mandate on the price of RINs. Second, the more elastic the demand for 
ethanol the less RIN prices increase for a given increase in the mandate. That is, the elasticities 
of demand and supply for ethanol determine the size of the increase in RIN prices from an 
increase in mandated ethanol volumes. Third, a more inelastic supply of gasoline implies that 
refineries absorb a larger share of the cost of RINs. Fourth, the more inelastic the demand for 
gasoline, the larger the share of the cost of RINs paid by motorists. The third and fourth points 
say that it is the relative magnitudes of the elasticities of demand and supply for gasoline that 
determine the relative burden to motorists and refineries of the cost of RINs. 
 De Gorter and Just (2009) derive the condition that determines when an increase in 
ethanol mandates results in an increase in the fuel price when gasoline and ethanol are perfect 
substitutes. Their condition does not depend on the elasticities of demand for gasoline and 
ethanol because they are equal by assumption. We derive an analogous condition when this 
assumption does not hold (see the Appendix). In our model, substitution between E10 and E85 
by FFV motorists makes the total demand for retail fuel more elastic than the demand for an 
individual fuel when volumes for E85 are sufficiently low. However, as Figure 2 shows, capacity 
constraints eventually make the demand for E85 by fuel stations more inelastic than the demand 
for E10. As E85 contains relatively more ethanol per volume than E10, the implication is that the 
inelastic demand for E85 makes the demand for ethanol at wholesale more inelastic than the 
demand for gasoline. Everything else being equal, constraints on the distribution of E85 makes it 
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more likely that an increase in mandates will increase retail fuel prices. Relaxing these 
constraints would make the demand for ethanol more elastic, which makes it more likely that 
increases in mandates will reduce retail fuel prices.  
To demonstrate the relevance of accounting for a lack of perfect substitution between 
ethanol and gasoline, we compare how fuel prices would be affected by a 13.8 billion gallon 
ethanol mandate in our model to how they would be affected under the assumption of perfect 
substitution for each of the combinations of elasticities used in this study. The results are given 
in Table 6. As shown, when the export demand elasticity for gasoline is -10 and the domestic 
supply elasticity is 0.1, our model predicts that the average fuel price will increase, whereas it 
would decrease under the assumption that ethanol and gasoline are perfect substitutes. This 
difference is caused by a more inelastic demand for ethanol when quantities of E85 approach 
their consumption limit. Thus, the calibration of a simple model that does not account for the 
specificity of the demand for E10 and E85 would then over-predict a decline in the average fuel 
price from an increase in the mandate. Pouliot and Babcock (2014) show that the installation of 
new E85 pumps would shift out the demand for E85. By pushing the maximum volume of E85 
that can be distributed in the United States, the demand for E85 would become more elastic. As 
such, the installation of new E85 pumps would create conditions more favorable for increased 
mandates to lower consumer fuel prices. 
 
Welfare 
It is straightforward to determine who benefits and who loses from an increase in ethanol 
mandates by simply observing the direction of price and quantity changes. If the average price of 
fuel increases due to a mandate, then consumers’ surplus declines. The surplus of ethanol plants 
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and corn farmers always increases. Oil companies’ surplus declines because they bear the cost of 
compliance. Nevertheless, for policy analysis it is useful to measure the size of welfare changes. 
Measurement and the interpretation of welfare in a general equilibrium model of a supply chain 
differ from that of a partial equilibrium model (Just and Hueth 1979). Given the nature of our 
model, we do not claim that we calculate exact measures of welfare but the measures we present 
below provide a reasonable approximation. 
Simple diagrams can give insight into our welfare calculations. We perform our analysis 
by focusing on the wholesale gasoline and ethanol markets. Figure 3a shows the wholesale 
market for gasoline assuming the United States is a small exporting country. Without an ethanol 
mandate, the market clearing domestic price, dP  equals the world wP  and domestic refineries 
produce sQ , exporting s wQ Q− . With an ethanol mandate that results in a RIN price of ρ  and an 
RVO of κ , the domestic price of gasoline increases to wP κρ+  and domestic gasoline 
consumption declines to dQ′ . Domestic consumer surplus that accrues to motorists from gasoline 
consumption declines by the area under the domestic demand curve between the higher domestic 
price and the world price. The loss in consumer surplus from higher wholesale gasoline prices 
equals the rectangle dQ κρ′  plus triangle abc . Producer surplus to refineries is unchanged.  
Figure 3b shows the ethanol market assuming no trade in ethanol. With a binding 
mandate, M, which is approximately equal to dQ κ′ , the supply price increases from P
∗  to sP  and 
the demand price decreases to dP . The resulting RIN price is ρ . Ethanol producers gain the area 
sP deP
∗ . Ethanol consumers (motorists) gain the area dP efP
∗ .  
The net change in consumer surplus is the sum of consumer surplus in the gasoline 
market and in the ethanol market. Note that the sum of producer and consumer surplus in the 
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ethanol market equals dQ κρ′  minus triangle def . If the supply of ethanol is perfectly elastic then 
there is a net loss in motorist surplus equals the sum of the triangles abc  and def . Additional 
losses accrue to motorists as the supply of ethanol becomes less elastic.  
 Table 7 shows changes in welfare for mandates of 13.8 and 14 billion gallons with 
respect to the case with no binding mandate for two scenarios on the export demand elasticity. 
All columns show changes in surplus except for the column for RIN which shows the total value 
of RINs. The total value of RINs, through changes in domestic and world prices for gasoline, is 
paid by motorists and refineries. Given that the increase in the mandate induces only a small 
change in gasoline volumes, changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus in the gasoline 
market are nearly rectangular. As such, the total change in surplus in the gasoline market is 
almost equal to the total value of RINs. 
In the scenario with a perfectly elastic export demand and a perfectly inelastic supply of 
gasoline, refineries are not impacted by increased ethanol volumes as they receive the same price 
and sell the same volume regardless of the biofuel mandate. Motorists gain on the ethanol market 
but lose a bit more on the gasoline market. The net welfare loss to motorists is $260 million with 
a 13.8 billion gallon mandate and $620 million dollars with a 14 billion gallon mandate. As 
expected, ethanol plants gain with their surplus increasing by $235 million and $488 million 
dollars with mandates of 13.8 and 14 billion gallons, respectively. The total change in welfare is 
small at $28 million with a 13.8 billion gallons mandate and $145 million with a 14 billion 
gallon mandate. 
 In the scenario with an export demand elasticity of -10 and a perfectly inelastic domestic 
gasoline supply, welfare changes in the ethanol market are similar to those in the previous 
scenario. Observe that the value of RIN and the total change in welfare are also similar to that in 
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the previous scenario. In the gasoline market however, with the export demand for gasoline 
being less than perfectly elastic the world price of gasoline is impacted by the increase in 
mandated ethanol volumes. As a result, refineries pay a share of the cost of RINs. With a 13.8 
billion gallon mandate, the surplus of refineries declines by $781 million. With a 14 billion 
gallons mandate the surplus of refineries declines by $1.658 billion. In this scenario, with 
refineries paying for a share of the cost of RINs, the retail price of gasoline at retail declines and 
the surplus of motorists increases.  
 
Policy Implications 
Our analysis demonstrates that the impact of US ethanol mandates on the price of E10 will be 
small because the impact of higher RIN prices on the price of gasoline is largely offset by a 
lower ethanol price (net of the value of RINs) that results from the lower E85 prices that are 
needed to increase E85 consumption. Our prediction of lower E85 prices is consistent with CBO 
(2014) which predicts that E85 prices in 2017 will be up to 51 percent lower because of higher 
mandates. However, our finding that the price of E10 will not be much affected by expanded 
ethanol mandates conflicts with CBO’s prediction that E10 prices will increase by between four 
and nine percent if mandates are allowed to increase. One reason for this difference is that 
CBO’s (2014) analysis assumes that all biofuel mandates are increased as scheduled in the 
Energy Independence and Security Act. This would require that 24 billion ethanol-equivalent 
gallons of biofuels would need to be consumed—a level that far exceeds the existing capacity to 
consume, produce, or import biofuels in the United States. Thus, CBO’s (2014) analysis was 
necessarily based on assumptions about what RIN prices would be, what mix of biofuels would 
be used to meet mandates, and the degree to which lower net values of biofuels due to high RIN 
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prices offset higher costs caused by compliance. CBO (2014) did not use an equilibrium model 
of supply and demand of fuels to derive their estimates.  
 Extending our model to consider much higher ethanol mandates than considered here 
would be straightforward as long as increased mandates are made feasible by expanded E85 
fueling infrastructure that increases the demand for E85, as in Pouliot and Babcock (2014). Such 
an analysis would not change our overall conclusion that the effects of ethanol mandates on the 
price of E10 would be small and that the price of E85 would be set at a low enough level to 
induce adequate ethanol consumption. 
  
Appendix 
In this appendix, we modify the model in de Gorter and Just (2009) to show how the mandate the 
impact retail gasoline price when including a second retail fuel category. We could derive this 
result from our model the simple modification of the model in de Gorter and Just (2009) yield 
more manageable solutions. 
 Let us begin by showing the model in de Gorter and Just (2009) and their result on the 
impact of expanding the mandate on retail gasoline price. The model assumes perfect 
competition, does not consider the RIN market explicitly, assumes domestic supply of ethanol 
and assumes no distinction between domestic and imported gasoline. Relative energy contents of 
gasoline and ethanol are not accounted for in the model, but it can be assumed that ethanol price 
and volume are measured in terms of gasoline equivalent. In de Gorter and Just (2009), the 
equations include variables for taxes and tax credit which we ignore here because ethanol is now 
taxed at the same rate as gasoline. With slight modifications to the notation, equations (7), (8) 
and (9) in de Gorter and Just (2009) are 
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(A.1) ( )1p wf e gp w wλ λ= + −  ; 
(A.2) ( ) ( ) ( )w pf f g g e eD p S w S w= + ; 
(A.3) ( ) ( )pf f e eD p S wλ = , 
where fp   is the price of fuel made of gasoline and ethanol, ( )f fD p  is the demand for fuel, 
( )dg gS w  is the supply of gasoline, ( )pe eS w  is the supply of ethanol, wgw   is the world price of 
wholesale gasoline and pew  is the price of wholesale ethanol paid to ethanol plants. In 
appearance, equation (A.1) does not account for the price of RIN as it is calculated using the 
world price of gasoline and the supply price of ethanol. However, with the weighting on gasoline 
and ethanol prices, the value of RIN cancels out in the equation. De Gorter and Just (2009) 
express the percentage standard as the share of ethanol in the total quantity of fuel. This is 
equivalent to our method of expressing the percentage standard as the ratio of ethanol over 
gasoline and we can write that ( )1κ λ λ= − . Equation (A.1) says that the price of retail gasoline 
is a weighted sum of the price of wholesale gasoline and wholesale ethanol. Equation (A.2) says 
that the total volume of fuel equals the sum of the volumes of gasoline and the volume of 
ethanol. Equation (A.3) says that the mandate holds with equality. 
 Totally differentiating (A.1)-(A.3) and writing the expressions in terms of elasticities de 
Gorter and Just (2009) find 
(A.4) 
( )
1 11 1
1
w p
g e
g ef
wp
ge e
p
e f e f g
w w
dp
d ww
p w p
ε ε
λ εθ θλ λ
ε ε
   
+ − +       =
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− + − 
  
 , 
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where θ  is the elasticity of demand for retail gasoline, eε  is the elasticity of supply of ethanol 
and gε  is the elasticity of supply for gasoline. The denominator is always negative and we can 
thus focus on the numerator to find the sign of the impact of an increase in the mandate on the 
price of fuel. De Gorter and Just (2009) find that the price of fuel increases with a rise in the 
mandate if the price weighted elasticity of gasoline is relatively larger than the price weighted 
elasticity of ethanol (i.e., ( ) ( )1 1 1 1w pg g e ew wε ε+ < + ). Otherwise, an increase in the mandate 
causes a decline in the price of fuel. 
 Our model considers E10 and E85 that contain different proportions of gasoline and 
ethanol. Although substitutes, limits on the ability of most vehicles to use E85 and limits on the 
availability of E85 cause the elasticity of demand for E10 and E85 to differ. As they contain 
different relative amounts of gasoline and E85, the implication is that the elasticity of demand for 
ethanol does not equal the elasticity of demand for gasoline. To account for this, we can re-write 
the equations in the model of de Gorter and Just (2009) as 
(A.5) ( )1p wf e gp w wλ λ= + −  ; 
(A.6) ( ) ( ) ( ),w p w pf g e g g e eD w w S w S w= + ; 
(A.7) ( ) ( ),w p pf g e e eD w w S wλ = . 
That is, the demand for fuel now differentiates between the price of gasoline and on the price of 
ethanol. Equation (A.5) then becomes a measure of the average price of fuel although it is not 
that average price that impacts the demand but the individual prices for ethanol and gasoline. 
 Total differentiation of (A.5)-(A.7) and writing the equations in terms of elasticities 
yields 
(A.8) ( )1p p w wf e e g gdp d w dw d w dwλ λ λ λ= + + + −  ; 
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(A.9) ( )1
w wp p
g ge e
g e g ew p w p
g e g e
dw dwdw dw
w w w w
η η λ ε λε+ = − + ; 
(A.10) 
w p p
g e e
g e ew p p
g e e
dw dw dwd
w w w
λ λη λη λε+ + = . 
Solving these equations, we find that 
(A.11)
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1
1
p w
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g e e g g
w wdp
d
λ θ λ ε θ ε ε θ λ θ λ ε θ ε ε θ
λ λ λ ε θ ε ε θ
+ − − + − + − + − + −
=
− − −
, 
where gθ  is the elasticity of demand for gasoline and eθ  is the elasticity of demand for ethanol. 
The denominator in (A.11) is always negative such that a rise in the mandate lowers the price of 
fuel if the numerator is positive. 
 Equation (A.11) relates to the result from de Gorter and Just (2009) in (A.4). In both 
equations, the condition at the numerator are elasticities weighted by ethanol and gasoline prices. 
On our case however, in addition to supply elasticities, the conditions include the elasticity of 
demand for gasoline, the elasticity of demand for ethanol and the mandated ratio of ethanol over 
gasoline. To check the impact of the elasticity of demand for ethanol on the condition at the 
numerator, with the numerator in (A.11) denoted as N , we take the partial derivative with 
respect to eθ : 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1 0p we g g g
e
N w wλ λε λε
θ
∂
= − + + >
∂
. 
This derivative says that the more inelastic the demand for ethanol (i.e., 0eθ ≤  tends toward 
zero), the more likely the numerator N takes a positive value. That is, an inelastic demand for 
ethanol contributes to an increase in the mandate to cause an increase in the price of fuel. In the 
32 
 
opposite way, an elastic demand for ethanol contributes to an increase in the mandate to cause a 
decline in the price of fuel. 
 Similarly, we can take the partial derivative of the numerator with respect to gθ  and we 
find that 
 ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 0p we e g e
g
N w wλ λ ε λ ε
θ
∂
= + − + − >
∂
.  
As with the elasticity of demand for ethanol, this expression says that an elastic demand for 
gasoline contributes to an increase in the mandate to cause a decline in the price of gasoline at 
retail.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Parameters used to calibrate the model 
Parameter Symbol Value Source/calculation 
Wholesale Price of gasoline (2013) wgw   $2.87/gal 
Calculated from USITC 
(2014) 
Net exports of gasoline (2013) wgx  4.1B gal 
Calculated from USITC 
(2014) 
Price of E10 (2013) 10p  $3.65/gal EIA (2014)  table 3 
Price of E85 (2013) 85p  $3.22/gal EIA (2014)  table 3 
Consumption of E85 (2013)a 85q  196M gal EIA (2014)  table 37 
Consumption of E10 (2013) a 10q  
132.6B 
gal 
EIA (2014)  table 37 
Consumption of E10 by light-duty 
(2013) a 
10lq  
126.5B 
gal 
EIA (2014)  table 37 
Number of gasoline cars and light trucks 
(2013) 
cltN  220.4M EIA (2014)  table 40 
Number of gasoline commercial light-
truck (2013) 
ltN  3.88M EIA (2014)  table 46 
Number of gasoline freight trucks (2013) tN  1.72M EIA (2014)  table 49 
Number of FFVs (2013) fN  14.6M Pouliot and Babcock (2014) 
Number of conventional vehicles (2013) cN  211.4M clt lt t fN N N N+ + −  
Elasticity of demand for retail gasoline φ  -0.25 Lin and Prince (2013) 
Notes: a EIA estimates of consumption are reported in trillion btu. We convert consumption in 
gallons assuming that gasoline contains 5.253 million Btu per barrel and that ethanol contains 
3.539 Btu per barrel (http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/sec12.pdf). 
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Table 2. Calculated parameters used in the model 
Parameter Symbol Value Calculation 
Gasoline supply intensity α   
Depends on 
selected value  of 
ε   
( ) ( )10 850.9 0.25 wg gq q x w
ε
+ +  
US gasoline export demand 
intensity 
β  
Depends on 
selected value  of 
η  
( )w wg gx w
η−
 
Consumption of E10 per flex 
vehicles 
10fq  574 gallons ( )101000 l cltq N  
Consumption of E10 per 
conventional vehicles 
10cq  587 gallons ( )10 101000 f f cq N q N−  
E10 demand intensity by 
conventional vehicles 
cβ  812.2 ( )10 10cq p φ−  
E10 demand intensity by flex 
vehicles 
10fβ  793.3 ( )10 10fq p φ−  
E85 demand intensity by flex 
vehicles 
85fβ  959.6 ( )( )10 100.776 0.776*fq p φ−  
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Table 3. Model solutions for base case (161 bushels per acre corn yield, perfectly elastic export demand, and perfectly inelastic 
gasoline supply) 
Volumes (billion gallons)  Prices ($/gallon) 
Mandate Ethanol Gasoline 
Gasoline 
exports E10 E85 Total 
 
E10 E85 Average 
Wholesale 
gasoline 
Wholesale 
ethanol RIN 
13.0 13.67 119.94 3.55 133.13 0.48 133.50  3.55 3.12 3.55 2.87 2.20 0.00 
13.2 13.67 119.94 3.55 133.13 0.48 133.50  3.55 3.12 3.55 2.87 2.20 0.00 
13.4 13.67 119.94 3.55 133.13 0.48 133.50  3.55 3.12 3.55 2.87 2.20 0.00 
13.6 13.67 119.94 3.55 133.13 0.48 133.50  3.55 3.12 3.55 2.87 2.20 0.00 
13.8 13.85 119.80 3.69 132.90 0.74 133.48  3.56 2.91 3.56 2.87 1.91 0.31 
14.0 14.03 119.65 3.84 132.66 1.02 133.45  3.56 2.57 3.56 2.87 1.43 0.81 
14.2* 14.18 119.55 3.94 132.50 1.23 133.45  3.57 1.53 3.56 2.87 0.00 2.25 
Note: * Not an exact solution.  
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Table 4. Model solutions for alternative corn yields (perfectly elastic export demand and perfectly inelastic gasoline supply) 
Volumes (Billion gallons)  Prices ($/gallon) 
Mandate Ethanol Gasoline 
Gasoline 
exports E10 E85 Total 
 
E10 E85 Average 
Wholesale 
gasoline 
Wholesale 
ethanol RIN 
Corn yield = 130 bushels per acre 
13.0 13.31 119.44 4.05 132.69 0.06 132.74  3.64 3.75 3.64 2.87 3.04 0.00 
13.2 13.31 119.44 4.05 132.69 0.06 132.74  3.64 3.75 3.64 2.87 3.04 0.00 
13.4 13.40 119.36 4.13 132.57 0.19 132.72  3.64 3.47 3.64 2.87 2.65 0.40 
13.6 13.58 119.20 4.29 132.31 0.46 132.67  3.64 3.20 3.64 2.87 2.28 0.80 
13.8 13.76 119.03 4.46 132.05 0.74 132.63  3.65 2.98 3.65 2.87 1.98 1.13 
14.0 13.94 118.87 4.62 131.79 1.01 132.58  3.66 2.65 3.65 2.87 1.51 1.63 
14.2* 14.09 118.75 4.74 131.60 1.23 132.56  3.67 1.56 3.66 2.87 0.00 3.16 
Corn yield = 170 bushels per acre 
13.6 13.87 120.08 3.41 133.22 0.73 133.79  3.52 2.89 3.52 2.87 1.90 0.00 
13.8 13.87 120.08 3.41 133.22 0.73 133.79  3.52 2.89 3.52 2.87 1.90 0.00 
14.0 14.06 119.94 3.55 132.98 1.02 133.77  3.53 2.54 3.53 2.87 1.40 0.51 
14.2* 14.22 119.86 3.62 132.82 1.25 133.80  3.54 1.52 3.53 2.87 0.00 1.93 
Note: * Not an exact solution.   
39 
 
Table 5. Model solutions with less than perfectly elastic export demand (161 bushels per acre corn yield) 
Volumes (Billion gallons)  Prices ($/gallon) 
Mandate Ethanol Gasoline 
Gasoline 
exports E10 E85 Total 
 
E10 E85 Average 
Wholesale 
gasoline 
Wholesale 
ethanol RIN 
Export demand elasticity = -10 and gasoline supply elasticity is 0.00 
13.6 13.66 119.74 3.75 132.90 0.49 133.29  3.58 3.13 3.58 2.90 2.20 0.00 
13.8 13.83 119.65 3.84 132.74 0.74 133.32  3.57 2.92 3.57 2.89 1.92 0.30 
14.0 14.02 119.65 3.93 132.56 1.02 133.35  3.57 2.58 3.57 2.88 1.44 0.80 
14.2* 14.17 119.50 4.00 132.43 1.24 133.39  3.58 1.54 3.57 2.88 0.00 2.27 
Export demand elasticity = -2 and gasoline supply elasticity is 0.00 
13.6 13.65 119.53 3.96 132.67 0.51 133.07  3.60 3.13 3.60 2.92 2.20 0.00 
13.8 13.81 119.50 3.99 132.57 0.74 133.15  3.59 2.94 3.59 2.91 1.94 0.28 
14.0 14.01 119.46 4.03 132.45 1.02 133.24  3.58 2.59 3.58 2.90 1.45 0.79 
14.2* 14.16 119.44 4.05 132.36 1.23 133.32  3.59 1.54 3.58 2.89 0.00 2.26 
Export demand elasticity = -10 and gasoline supply elasticity is 0.10 
13.6 13.66 119.77 3.81 132.94 0.49 133.32  3.57 3.13 3.57 2.89 2.20 0.00 
13.8 13.83 119.68 3.88 132.77 0.74 133.35  3.57 2.92 3.57 2.89 1.92 0.30 
14.0 14.02 119.57 3.96 132.58 1.02 133.37  3.57 2.57 3.57 2.88 1.44 0.80 
14.2* 14.16 119.53 4.00 132.47 1.22 133.41  3.58 1.54 3.57 2.88 0.00 2.22 
Export demand elasticity = -10 and gasoline supply elasticity is 1.00 
13.6 13.67 119.87 3.98 133.06 0.48 133.43  3.56 3.12 3.56 2.88 2.20 0.00 
13.8 13.84 119.75 4.01 133.85 0.74 133.43  3.56 2.92 3.56 2.88 1.92 0.30 
14.0 14.03 119.62 4.04 132.63 1.02 133.42  3.57 2.57 3.56 2.87 1.44 0.80 
14.2* 14.17 119.54 4.06 132.48 1.23 133.44  3.58 1.54 3.56 2.87 0.00 2.25 
Note: * Not an exact solution.  
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Table 6. Elasticities of demand and supply of gasoline (13.8 billion gallon mandate and 161 
bushels per acre corn yield) 
 
Prediction from 
de Gorter and Just (2009) 
Change in price 
of retail fuel 
η → −∞  & 0ε =  > 0 > 0 
10η = −  & 0ε =   < 0 < 0 
2η = −    & 0ε =   < 0 < 0 
10η = −  & 0.1ε =  < 0 > 0 
10η = −  & 10ε =  > 0 > 0 
 
 
Table 7. Change in welfare compare to non-binding mandate in billion dollars (161 bushels 
per acre corn yield) 
 Ethanol Gasoline    
Mandate 
(1) 
Motorists 
(2) 
Producers 
(3) 
Motorists 
(4) 
Refineries 
(5) 
Motorists 
(1+3) 
(6) 
RIN 
-(3+4) 
(7) 
Welfare 
(1+2+3+4) 
Export demand elasticity = -∞ and gasoline supply elasticity is 0.00 
13.8 4.219 0.235 -4.482 0.000 -0.261 4.482 -0.028 
14.0 10.835 0.488 -11.454 0.000 -0.620 11.468 -0.145 
Export demand elasticity = -10 and gasoline supply elasticity is 0.00 
13.8 4.032 0.228 -3.528 -0.781 0.504 4.285 -0.026 
14.0 10.691 0.490 -9.712 -1.658 0.978 11.325 -0.144 
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Figure 1. Model structure 
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 Figure 2. Wholesale demand for E85 
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Figure 3a. Mandate impacts on gasoline                 Figure 3b. Mandate impacts on ethanol 
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